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SURVEY





In bringing an action for defamation, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case by demonstrating that there has been an actionable communication,'
that the defendant was responsible for publication of that communication
I. In determining whether a plaintiff has made a showing of an actionable communi-
cation, distinctions must be made between categories of defamation. The tort of libel in-
volves a defamatory communication of a permanent sort such as printed matter, films, and
art work. Slander encompasses transitory, ephemeral communications such as speech, ges-
tures and sign language.
At common law, a plaintiff in a libel suit was not required to plead or prove actual pecuni-
ary damage resulting from the communication. A plaintiff could seek "general damages,"
allowing recovery for harms such as emotional and physical stress or general disgrace in the
eyes of society without proving a nexus between the harm and monetary loss. Sowder v.
Nolan, 125 A.2d 52, 55 (D.C. 1956) (general damages presumed where jury finds libelous
communication not privileged); Norfolk & Washington Steamboat Co. v. Davis, 12 App.
D.C. 306 (1898) (libel award of both general and future damages for mental suffering, dis-
grace, and disrepute allowed). See also Washington Times Co. v. Downey, 26 App. D.C.
258 (1905) (broad scope allowed in proof of damages for mental suffering).
In order to recover in a slander action, however, a plaintiff must prove "special damages."
This requires a plaintiff to prove specific economic harm. Shipe v. Schenk, 158 A.2d 910
(D.C. 1960) (phrases not slanderous per se do not support action if no special damages
proven); Friedlander v. Rapley, 38 App. D.C. 208 (1912) (spoken accusation that theater
patron failed to pay admission price not actionable without proof of special damages); Cain
v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 3 App. D.C. 546 (1894) (phone operators telling callers
that party refuses to answer his business phone not actionable without proof of special dam-
ages). As a practical matter, proving specific out-of-pocket damages caused by a slanderous
remark is difficult, barring recovery in most instances. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 765
(4th ed. 1971).
There is an exception to the special damages requirement for slanderous statements im-
puting criminal conduct, infection with serious or contagious disease, unchastity on the part
of a woman, or misconduct or inept handling of one's profession, trade, office, or business.
Oral communications of this type, when false, are slanderous per se and no pecuniary loss
need be proven in order for a plaintiff to maintain a successful action. Meyerson v. Hurlbut,
98 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 610 (1938) (unethical trade practices-
selling goods at below cost); Farnum v. Colbert, 293 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1972) (crime involving
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to a third party,2 and that the third party understood the defamatory
meaning of that communication as it applied to the plaintiff.3 A statement
is defamatory if it tends to subject a person to public shame and ridicule,
or if it tends to injure the plaintiff in his trade or profession or lower him in
the estimation of his community.4 Once a plaintiff has proven a prima
moral turptitude-theft); Brice v. Curtis, 38 App. D.C. 304, 306 (1912) (citing Act of March
3, 1901, ch. 854, 31 Stat. 1189, 1323) (unchastity).
Much confusion (and conflict between jurisdictions) has resulted from courts making de-
lineations between libel, libel per quod, slander, and slander per se. A defamation per se is a
communication which has an obvious and plainly defamatory meaning. In contrast, a defa-
mation per quod is a communication that does not have a clear, defamatory meaning on its
face. Surrounding circumstances or extrinsic facts must be noted in order to impute a de-
famatory meaning to the statement.
The confusion and conflict has arisen because some jurisdictions have held, in derogation
of the common law, that libel per quod should be treated the same as slander and subject to
the special damages requirement. See Note, Libel Per Se and Special Damages, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 730 (1960). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 762-64 (4th ed. 1971). One
rationale for the stricter standard may be that the courts which have adopted the proof of
damages requirement have deemed libel per quod a somewhat less complete showing of
defamation, thereby necessitating a greater burden of proof for recovery. Id at 763. The
majority of jurisdictions have not adopted the special damages requirement in actions in-
volving libel per quod. Nonetheless, the inconsistent use of the terms per se and per quod
has created uncertainty in many jurisdictions as to whether this new libel per quod standard
has been adopted. For a series of articles on libel per quod, see Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46
VA. L. REV. 839 (1960); Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV.
733 (1966); Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1629 (1966); Eldredge, Varia-
tion On Libel Per Quod, 25 VAND. L. REV. 79 (1972).
In the District of Columbia, two opinions have implied that the libel per quod special
damages requirement has been adopted into the law of the District sub silentio. Sullivan v.
Meyer, 91 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (newspaper article describing person's negative opinion
towards anti-patriotic and pro-communist textbooks is not libel per se; demurrer thus upheld
because no showing of special damages); Washington Times Co. v. Bonner, 86 F.2d 836,
844 (D.C. Cir, 1936) (no need for alleging or proving special damages when a published
article is libelous per se because damage is presumed). See also Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46
VA. L. REV. 839, 848 (1960). However, the question as to District of Columbia law seems to
be resolved in Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(en banc) (stating explicitly that proof of special damages is not required in a libel per quod
action). The common law doctrine of requiring special damages only in slander cases thus
appears to remain in force in the District of Columbia.
2. Washington Annapolis Hotel Co. v. Riddle, 171 F.2d 732, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(must be communicated to someone other than person defamed); United Cigar Stores Co. v.
Young, 36 App. D.C. 390 (1911) (burden upon plaintiff to prove publication).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 (1977); Riss & Co. v. Association of
Am. R.Rs., 187 F. Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1960), rev'don other grounds, Association of W. Rys. v.
Riss & Co., 299 F.2d 133, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 916 (1962) (when group defamed, plaintiff
has to show sufficient identification of himself; size of class of persons defamed is factor to
be considered); Harmon v. Liss, 116 A.2d 693 (D.C. 1955) (person need not be specifically
named in communication in order to recover as long as person is identifiable).
4. Hearst Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.
1948) (libel); Smith v. District of Columbia, 399 A.2d 213 (D.C. 1979) (slander).
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facie defamation, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff unless the defend-
ant can show that, under the circumstances in which it was made, the com-
munication was privileged.5
The defense of privilege is a result of society's desire to balance the in-
terest of the person defamed in protecting his or her reputation against the
interests of the communicant and the public in having the information
communicated.6 Courts have recognized that a privilege exists when, in
the balance, the interest of communicating the information is judged more
important than the preservation of the defamed person's reputation.7
Privileged communications are divided into two general classes: abso-
lutely privileged communications, and qualified or conditionally privi-
leged communications. Complete protection and immunity from liability
in tort is afforded to a communicator when he or she is absolutely privi-
leged, whereas communications which are covered by a qualified or condi-
tional privilege provide protection to a communicator only in the absence
of actual malice.8
5. See Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F.2d 742, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (per curiam) (burden of proof
is on defendant to show privilege as affirmative defense); Brice v. Curtis, 38 App. D.C. 304,
307 (1912) (burden on defendant to show occasion of privilege).
Two other common law defenses besides privilege that generally are recognized are fair
comment and truth. Fair comment is essentially a qualified privilege to defame in com-
menting on matters of public interest. Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78,
87 (D.C. 1980), ceri. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981) (fair comment a qualified privilege to de-
fame when object of defamation is not a public official); Washington Times Co. v. Bonner,
86 F.2d 836, 841-43 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (right of fair comment recognized). See generally An-
not., 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (fair
comment broadened to permit communication of erroneous facts; fair comment raised to a
constitutional privilege when the communication related to conduct of public officials in
performing their duties). See also infra note 13 and accompanying text.
6. This balancing between interests has constitutional implications. The law of defa-
mation may impose restrictions upon those who seek to exercise their right of free expression
under the first amendment. Detailed discussion of such constitutional considerations, how-
ever, is beyond the scope of this Note.
7. Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1940) (gen-
eral considerations of public policy and convenience require the according of privilege). See
generally 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 87 (1955 & Supp. 1983).
8. There are two meanings to the term "actual malice," for the purpose of defeating a
qualified privilege. They depend on the status of the person defamed. If the plaintiff is a
public official or public figure, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and its
progeny define actual malice as knowledge of falsity of the statement or reckless disregard of
whether the statement was true or false. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967) (defines requirement for actual malice for
libel with regard to public officials); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 988 (1968). If the plaintiff is not a
public official or public figure, then the common law definition of actual malice applies. In
the District of Columbia, the common law definition of where a qualified privilege applies
appears to be very similar to the New York Times definition for public figures. For example,
in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Holland, 367 A.2d 1311 (D.C. 1977), a case involving private
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Courts recognize a qualified privilege in instances in which the dissemi-
nation of the information from one party to another or to the general pub-
lic is an important interest, but when balanced against the important
interest of protecting a defamed individual's reputation or livelihood,
should be checked against the abusiveness of a defamatory communication
made recklessly or intentionally. The qualified privilege is by definition a
situational privilege. It has been invoked in situations in which statements
have been made defending the legitimate interests of the communicator,9
protecting the interests of third parties,' ° or carrying out a duty to inform
another party when that duty arises out of a common interest." The qual-
ified privilege has been applied to .communications between public officials
or others having a public interest"2 and also in situations involving fair
comment on issues of public interest.' 3
In some instances, however, the interests of society in assuring free and
open communication are so compelling that courts will confer an absolute
privilege or immunity from defamation liability. The risk in granting a
license to injure or destroy reputations is adjudged less significant than the
persons as plaintiffs, the court defined malice as "the doing of an act without just cause or
excuse, with such a conscious indifference or reckless disregard as to its results or effects
upon the rights or feelings of others as to constitute ill will." Id. at 1314 (quoting Dun &
Bradstreet v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 345 S.W. 2d 34 (1961)). See also Smith v. District of
Columbia, 399 A.2d 213, 219 (D.C. 1979). This is contrasted with the private plaintiff stan-
dard in nonprivilege cases. In those instances, the District of Columbia has adopted the
negligence standard set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See Phil-
lips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78, 90 (1980).
9. Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (statement
made in protection of own interests including one's business is qualifiedly privileged);
Thomas v. Howard, 168 A.2d 908 (D.C. 1961) (employer has qualified privilege to inquire
into how employees were conducting employer's affairs).
10. Blake v. Trainer, 148 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (statement held qualifiedly privileged
when officer of union informed union of dereliction of duty of other officers); Alfred A.
Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & Nolan, 374 A.2d 284 (D.C. 1977) (communica-
tions made by architect in defense of client held qualifiedly privileged); May Dept. Stores
Co. v. Devercelli, 314 A.2d 767, 773 (D.C. 1973) (store detective's questions directed to sus-
pect were protected by qualified privilege).
11. Roland v. d'Arazien, 685 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (statement to fellow employee
about conduct of worker in office was qualifiedly privileged); Greenya v. George Washing-
ton Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975) (statements by
college faculty members discussing qualities of colleagues held qualifiedly privileged).
12. Sowder v. Nolan, 125 A.2d 52 (D.C. 1956) (letters written out of sense of social duty
to police officials about an officer's misconduct protected by qualified privilege).
13. Safe Site, Inc. v. National Rifle Ass'n of Am., 253 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1966) (com-
ment that gun accessory performed poorly constituted fair comment and was qualifiedly
privileged); Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1965) (newspaper's com-




assurance of communication unrestrained by the chilling effect of a qualifi-
cation.' 4 Absolute privilege is afforded to ensure independence and lack
of fear from those participating in the public's business within the context
of judicial, 5 legislative,' 6 executive,' 7 and administrative' 8 proceedings.
Over the years, courts have steadfastly limited expansion of the breadth
of privileges, particularly the absolute privilege. 9 Judicial proceedings are
an area of absolute privilege, however, that continue to provide fertile
ground for expansion, particularly those that serve as an alternative to our
conventional court system.
In regard to traditional judicial proceedings, the common law of the
District of Columbia affords parties absolute privilege in statements pre-
liminary to or in the course of a judicial proceeding so long as the defama-
tory matter has some relation to the proceeding.2" The precise limits of
absolute privilege attached to judicial proceedings are not clear. Courts in
the District of Columbia have held that the standard to be applied in judg-
ing the relationship between the defamatory statement and the judicial
proceeding is one broader than "legal relevance."'"
In determining the requisite level of relevance, one case suggested that
the relationship between the statement and the proceeding should be con-
14. See Comment, Defamation, Privilege, and the Public Interest. A Study In Priorities,
45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 131, 139 (1978) (author suggests qualified privilege may be impotent
as a vehicle to encourage the communication of important information).
15. Owen v. Kronheim, 304 F.2d 957, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (citing Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871)) (remarks by judge in his official capacity absolutely
privileged).
16. Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874 (1930) (cit-
ing U.S. Const. art. I, § 6) (speech in U.S. Senate chamber absolutely privileged); McGov-
ern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960) (absolute privilege covered speeches within
congressional chamber and official publication of congressional proceedings).
17. Brownfield v. Landon, 307 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 371 U.S. 924 (1962)
(statements made by government officers in their official capacities absolutely privileged);
Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1940) (absolute privilege
accorded government official for statements made in connection with general matters com-
mitted by law to his control or supervision).
18. Cassel v. Overholser, 169 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 939 (1949)
(superintendent of mental hospital had absolute privilege when responding to patient's writ
of habeas corpus); Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (per curiam) (statements
made in connection with transaction of federal government commission's business vested
with executive and quasi-judicial powers absolutely privileged).
19. See, e.g., L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 75(e), at 413-14 (1978) (states
sharply limit scope of absolute privilege applying to state officers or officials due to per-
ceived lack of self-restraint among those whose appointments are largely political).
20. Brown v. Collins, 402 F.2d 209, 211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (claim of absolute privilege
denied to statements made by one party involved in contract dispute to opposing party re-
garding incompetence of opposing party's attorney).
21. Id See infra note 24.
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strued liberally, so that the privilege embraces any potentially pertinent
statement. 22 All doubt, therefore, should be resolved in favor of the rele-
vance of the statement.2 3 Still another case vaguely stated that statements
made in pleadings and affidavits are absolutely privileged if they have
enough appearance of connection with the case for which they are filed
that a reasonable man might think them relevant; nevertheless, they need
not be relevant in any strict sense. 24 Faced with the absence of clear artic-
ulation concerning the boundaries of the absolute privilege in traditional
judicial proceedings, it is somewhat instructive to note instances in which
it has been recognized. Besides communications within the courtroom it-
self, absolute privilege has been expressly recognized by District of Colum-
bia courts in regard to statements made in pleadings, complaints, motions
and affidavits,25 and the privilege has been granted to the litigants them-
selves, their counsel and judges.
26
In recent times, our judicial system has struggled to bear the heavy case
loads produced by our litigious society. In the last decade, for instance, the
number of civil cases filed in federal district courts has risen by eighty-
eight percent. 27 An effort to mold our judicial system to changing times
has resulted in increased recognition of alternative tribunals as legitimate
forums for dispute resolution. 8 With this recognition, courts have begun
22. Young v. Young, 18 F.2d 807, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (information in pleading about
husband's previous marriage and about former wife held relevant to determining present
wife's divorce settlement).
23. Id
24. Brown v. Shimabukuro, 118 F.2d 17, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (statements in affidavit
filed in support of codefendant's motion for rehearing, which charged plaintiffs father with
blackmailing defendant through threat of court action, held absolutely privileged). "A rea-
sonable man might think that the statements of the defendants regarding the plaintiff were
relevant, for they had some appearance of connection with the. . . [issues of the case]." Id.
at 18
25. Williams v. Williams, 169 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1958) (affidavit germane to court
case and filed therein stating why minister was deposed may not serve as grounds for action
in defamation); Harlow v. Carroll, 6 App. D.C. 128 (1895) (absolute privilege applies only if
the matter contained in pleadings is relevant).
26. Mohler v. Houston, 356 A.2d 646 (D.C. 1976) (allegations made by wife's counsel in
legal brief concerning husband's conduct during deterioration of marriage held relevant and
absolutely privileged in connection with divorce proceeding). See supra note 15.
27. Unclogging the Courts- Chief Justice Speaks Out, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
22, 1982, at 36, 39.
28. Burger, Isn't ThereA Better Way4 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-77 (1982). In his annual
report on the state of the judiciary, Chief Justice Burger advocated arbitration as one alter-
native to litigation. See generally Trotter & Cooper, State Trial Court Delay. Efforts at Re-
form, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 213 (1982) (summary of different approaches to reducing court
delays, including creation of alternative criminal and civil dispute resolution mechanisms,
and discussion of changes in police charging practices, prosecutorial screening, plea negotia-
tion policies, and state court structure and organization); Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, The
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embracing alternative "quasi-judicial" tribunals, and are affording those
forums status as judicial proceedings within the scope of absolute
privilege.
In Sturdivant v. Seaboard Service System, Ltd,29 the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals ruled that communications in the context of an arbi-
tration proceeding are absolutely privileged from liability in a defamation
action.3" The court likened the arbitration forum to a judicial proceeding
and afforded absolute privilege to a statement made by a witness during a
labor grievance arbitration proceeding. This Note will analyze the broad-
ening scope of absolute privilege and its possible effect on adjudication
through arbitration in the District of Columbia. It will conclude that
granting such absolute privilege is essential to ensure free and open com-
munications in arbitration proceedings.
I. EXTENSION OF ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE TO QUASI-JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
The dispute-solving mechanisms contained in collective bargaining
agreements were the first alternatives to conventional court litigation to be
included within the scope of absolute privilege. 3' In the seminal case of
General Motors Corp. v. Mendicki,32 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reasoned that without an absolute privilege covering
participants in a collective bargaining settlement process, the likelihood of
peaceable resolution of conflicts between the parties would be greatly de-
creased.33 Mendicki, who was employed by General Motors, was accused
of converting company property to his own use and was subsequently dis-
charged.34 He filed a grievance with his union representative. At a meet-
ing of union and company officials held for the purpose of settling the
grievance, one General Motors representative made a sweeping accusation
of Mendicki.35 Mendicki's efforts to redress his grievance through union-
Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, JUDGES J., Summer 1981, at 36 (outlining the use of
compulsory civil arbitration).
29. 459 A.2d 1058 (D.C. 1983).
30. Id. at 1060.
31. See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 1041 (1974) (scope of privilege regarding commu-
nications made in the course of grievance or arbitration proceedings held pursuant to collec-
tive bargaining agreements).
32. 367 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1966).
33. Id at 71.
34. Id at 67. The company had an established policy that employees would be sus-
pended for theft of company property.
35. Id. at 70. A personnel director for General Motors stated that he knew Mendicki
had been taking company property for some time, but had not been able to prove it. The
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company procedures failed.3 6 He brought an action in slander in the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas against General
Motors for the accusatory statement made by its representative.37 The
court rendered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Mendicki.38
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, General Motors argued that the state-
ments made during the union-company meeting were absolutely privi-
leged.39 The court agreed, and held that prompt settlements of labor
grievances were in the public interest and that absolute privilege would
preserve the quasi-judicial, dispute-resolving nature of labor contract pro-
ceedings."0 The lack of such a privilege, the Mendicki court reasoned,
would interfere with the national labor policy of prompt settlement of la-
bor disputes.4 Congressional intent, the court said, was "that full, frank,
uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate between the representatives of
the employer and employee in such conferences and bargaining sessions
should be encouraged. 42
Other courts that have broadened the absolute privilege placed less em-
phasis on the labor policy implications stressed by the Tenth Circuit in
Mendicki. In Neece v. Kantu, 43 the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected
the contention that slanderous statements made by a company manager to
an employee in the presence of fellow employees were an indispensable
part of the grievance-settling procedure of a labor contract, and held that
such statements were not absolutely privileged." However, the court held
that a written report of an investigatory hearing was absolutely
privileged.45
A supervisor for Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) allegedly observed
David Neece, one of the company's airport employees, assisting two other
men in taking some of TWA's beverage service supplies.46 The supervisor
reported the incident to the manager of operations. In the course of inves-
conference was held pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement to adjust the grievance
prior to moving to the next step-arbitration. Id at 69-70.
36. Id
37. Id at 67.
38. Id
39. Id at 67, 71-72.
40. Id at 71.
41. Id at 70-71 (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 383 U.S. 53, 62
(1966)). See Comment, The Availability of Defamation Remediesfor Statements Made Dur-
ing the Course of Labor Grievance Arbitration Proceedings, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 553 (1967).
42. 367 F.2d at 71 (citing Linn, 383 U.S. at 62).
43. 84 N.M. 700, 507 P.2d 447 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 696, 507 P.2d 443 (1973).
44. 84 N.M. at 707, 507 P.2d at 454.
45. Id at 706, 507 P.2d at 453.
46. Id at 704, 507 P.2d at 451.
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tigating, the manager interrogated Neece in the company parking lot in the
presence of several of Neece's fellow employees, and then dismissed him.47
Neece filed a grievance, upon which an investigatory hearing was held to
determine its validity. 48 The presiding company official subsequently
wrote a letter to Neece denying the grievance allegations and upholding
his discharge. 49 Neece brought an action for slander in the District Court
of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, for the remarks made by the manager
during Neece's parking lot interrogation, and libel for the written state-
ments contained in the company official's post-hearing letter.5" The trial
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that in both
instances, the company officials were following procedures expressly pro-
vided for in the collective bargaining contract and were thus absolutely
privileged in their communications. 5'
Neece appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, which placed less
emphasis on the collective bargaining contract rationale than the trial
court had in finding absolute privilege. 2 It reversed the summary judg-
ment on the slander count, reasoning that the statements made in the park-
ing lot were merely part of one man's independent investigation, and as
such, should not be absolutely privileged.53 The court held, however, that
the written hearing report was absolutely privileged.54 Noting that the in-
vestigative proceeding was held before a hearing officer with both parties
present, and that testimony and evidence were presented during the course
of the proceeding, the court reasoned that the grievance procedure was
merely an agreed-upon substitute for legal action and was quasi-judicial in
nature. 5 Thus, the court held that the communications within the pro-
ceeding and the hearing officer's report of the proceeding were absolutely
privileged from liability for defamation.56
Neece's recognition of proceedings as "quasi-judicial" substitutes for
court action was significant. The impetus for according absolute privilege




50. Id at 702, 507 P.2d at 449. Neece also included a count of wrongful discharge,
which was dismissed by the trial court as having already been adjudicated through the pro-
cedures of the collective bargaining contract. Id at 706-07, 507 P.2d at 454-55.
51. Id at 703, 507 P.2d at 450.
52. Id. at 705-07, 507 P.2d at 452-54.
53. Id. at 707, 507 P.2d at 454.
54. Id. at 705, 507 P.2d at 452.
55. Id. at 706, 507 P.2d at 453.
56. Id at 706, 507 P.2d at 453.
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dures, to protecting persons making communications within dispute-set-
tling tribunals from defamation liability. The court focused on whether
the proceeding was "quasi-judicial," that is, whether it had the characteris-
tics of a judicial proceeding.
5 7
II. ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE EXTENDED TO QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Sturdivant v. Seaboard Service System, Ltd arose as a suit in both libel
and slander as a result of a written violation report on employee dishon-
esty and statements made during a subsequent arbitration hearing.
58
Wayne Sturdivant, a member of the United Food and Commercial Work-
ers union, was a cashier at a Safeway grocery store. 9 Safeway had hired
defendant Seaboard Service System, Ltd. (Seaboard) to conduct surveil-
lance and security investigations and to provide Safeway with reports of
employee dishonesty.6" Seaboard deployed a three-person undercover in-
vestigative team to the store where Sturdivant worked. One investigator
made a small purchase from Sturdivant. Rather than placing the money
inside the cash register, Sturdivant allegedly placed it on the cash register
ledge. He then failed to enter the purchase on the cash register. 6 Based
upon the investigator's written report to Safeway, Sturdivant was sus-
pended immediately and was later terminated for cause.62
The union filed a grievance on Sturdivant's behalf.63 At a resulting pre-
arbitration hearing conference and later during testimony at the arbitra-
tion hearing, the investigator described what she had observed during the
incident.64 Sturdivant brought a libel action against Seaboard for the writ-
57. A quasi-judicial proceeding has been described as any hearing which performs a
judicial function, exparte or otherwise, whether the proceeding is public or not, but which is
not conducted by a state or federal court. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 1, at
779-80. See Lambdin Funeral Serv. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. 1978) (absolute privi-
lege afforded to statements made during judicial proceeding of Tennessee Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers). The American Law Institute recognized, in the final draft of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, that quasi-judicial proceedings may be covered by an abso-
lute privilege by noting that an arbitration proceeding may be included within the ambit of
absolute privilege in judicial proceedings. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585 com-
ment c, 586 comment d, 587 comment f, 588 comment d (1977).
58. 459 A.2d 1058 (D.C. 1983).
59. Id. at 1058-59.
60. Id. at 1059.
61. Id. The purchase did not appear on the cash register's record tape.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. Id. The arbitrator denied the union's grievance and concluded that Sturdivant had
taken the money for his own use.
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ten violation report65 combined with a slander action for the statements
made at the prehearing conference and the formal arbitration hearing.66
The trial court recognized the existence of an absolute privilege for the
oral statements, and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of
Seaboard.67
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Sturdi-
vant's argument that the "hearing was less than judicial.' ,68 It held that
an absolute privilege existed for statements made during an arbitration
hearing.69 Citing Mendicki and Neece, Judge Pryor reasoned that an abso-
lute privilege would enable participants to state and support their positions
without fear of a retributive defamation action.7"
III. BREADTH OF THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
While the Sturdivant court granted absolute privilege to statements
made in connection with arbitration proceedings, its opinion contained no
express language as to the boundaries of the privilege. It is not clear what
statements might be considered to be within the frame of an arbitration
proceeding, and thus protected, or even what type of proceedings are
protected.
A. Which Arbitration Proceedings Are Protected
Mendicki extended absolute privilege to a grievance proceeding with
65. Id. at 1058. Sturdivant's count for libel concerning the written violation report was
filed beyond the one year statute of limitations period and was disposed of by the trial court
through summary judgment. Id at n.1.
66. Id at 1058.
67. Id at 1059-60.
68. Id. at 1059. Sturdivant had argued that only a qualifedprivilege should be applied.
A finding of qualified privilege would have possibly allowed the plaintiff to rebuke the privi-
lege and prevail by demonstrating actual malice on the part of the investigator. Because the
court found that an absolute privilege existed, the court determined that it need not reach
the question of the existence of actual malice. Id at 1060. See supra note 8.
69. 459 A.2d at 1060. The court noted that some jurisdictions favor a qualified rather
than an absolute privilege, but it found the more reasoned view to be that an absolute privi-
lege was applicable. Id The court cited no jurisdictions that grant merely a qualified privi-
lege to communicants in arbitration proceedings. For a listing of such jurisdictions, see
Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 1041, 1051-52 (1974).
70. 459 A.2d at 1060. The Sturdivant court cited Barnes v. Avis Rent A Car, 466 F.
Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1979), in which absolute immunity was afforded to the same statement
made in both a trial and a subsequent union arbitration proceeding. The Barnes court relied
on Brown v. Collins, 402 F.2d 209, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (judicial proceeding) and Joftes v.
Kaufman, 324 F. Supp 660, 664 (D.D.C. 1971) (union arbitration proceeding). The issue of
granting absolute privilege to statements made during such proceedings was one of first
impression for the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
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emphasis on the fact that the proceeding arose from a labor dispute.7'
Neece also involved labor grievance procedures arising from a collective
bargaining contract. 2 Since Sturdivant also fits this fact pattern, the scope
of the opinion arguably could be limited to a recognition of-absolute privi-
lege in arbitration proceedings involving labor disputes arising from a col-
lective bargaining contract. Unlike Mendicki and Neece, however,
Sturdivant made no mention of concern for labor policy or for protection
of labor grievance procedures. Instead, the court adopted the broad
"quasi-judicial proceeding" rationale announced in Neece by using the
word "arbitration" in a general sense, thereby suggesting that the court's
recognition of absolute privilege was not narrowly limited to the facts in
Sturdivant.
The possibility that the court intended to extend absolute privilege to
arbitration proceedings in general is further supported by the court's citing
of the District of Columbia's new voluntary arbitration rules. 73 The rules,
which have been in effect since 1982, give litigants the choice of a speedier
and less expensive procedure than the traditional courtroom for resolving
their civil disputes. This is accomplished through court-supervised, bind-
ing or non-binding arbitration proceedings." The Sturdivant court was
intent on preserving this dispute-settling alternative to the court system. It
reasoned that the denial of an absolute privilege to witnesses, parties, arbi-
trators and counsel who participate in arbitration proceedings would
"chill" the effect of the new rules. 75 The court noted that if parties in arbi-
tration hearings were given less protection than those in purely judicial
proceedings, there would be a built-in disincentive against using the arbi-
tration system.7 6 Since the rules permit voluntary arbitration of nearly all
civil disputes, 77 Sturdivant implies that absolute privilege applies to all ar-
71. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
73. 459 A.2d at 1060 (citing SUPER. CT. R. Civ. ARB.). See 110 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at
109 (Jan. 19, 1982).
74. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. ARB. 1-11. See generally Note, Voluntary Arbitration Program,
31 CATH. U.L. REV. 865 (1982).
75. 459 A.2d at 1060.
76. Id
77. The new Superior Court Arbitration Rules provide that any civil action, with the
exception of small claims and landlord and tenant actions, and cases involving claims for
equitable or declaratory relief, may be settled through the arbitration program. SUPER. CT.
R. Civ. ARB. 1. Parties agreeing to arbitration have the opportunity to have all aspects of
their dispute heard and decided by a randomly-chosen attorney-arbitrator who is knowl-
edgeable in the particular subject matter of the suit and who has completed a court-ap-
proved arbitration training program. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. ARB. 4-6. The arbitrator has full
power to issue subpoenas, decide all motions and discovery disputes, swear witnesses, and
otherwise handle the action as if a superior court trial judge were hearing the matter.
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bitration proceedings, not merely those involving labor disputes or collec-
tively bargained contracts.
While the court did not clarify what types of dispute-settling proceed-
ings fall within the ambit of arbitration, it would seem that only proceed-
ings with orderly, quasi-judicial decisional processes should be accorded
absolute immunity from the threat of defamation liability. Many of the
traditional safeguards of justice associated with quasi-judicial proceedings,
such as the right to an impartial decision maker, the right of both sides to
be heard, and the right to refute documents and testimony, allow the po-
tential damage of a defamatory statement to be mitigated.78 In less formal
dispute-settling proceedings without these provisions, such as informal ne-
gotiating sessions, the formal opportunity to refute defamatory statements
may be limited, and the license to injure or destroy reputations that an
absolute privilege may afford should not be granted.
B. Scope of Protection
Sturdivant is not clear as to what communications may be considered
protected. The court maintained that the protection of absolute immunity
from defamation liability has been afforded to statements made "pursu-
ant" to an arbitration proceeding.79 The opinion indicates that statements
of witnesses, parties, arbitrators and counsel who participate in these pro-
ceedings are absolutely privileged."0 What remains uncertain, however, is
whether ancillary communications and proceedings are to be afforded ab-
solute privilege. Sturdivant involved a statement made at a prehearing
conference that was later repeated during the actual hearing."' The court
has thus held that statements made at a pre-arbitration hearing conference,
one form of ancillary proceeding, were absolutely privileged.
The question remains open as to what communications in connection
with arbitration proceedings are afforded the privilege. For example, tele-
SUPER. CT. R. Civ. ARB. 6. See Note, Voluntary Arbitration Progran; 31 CATH. U.L. REV.
865, 866-67 (1982).
78. See Jenson v. Olson, 273 Minn. 390, 392-93, 141 N.W.2d 488, 490 (1965) (some
attributes of a quasi-judicial proceeding include issuing of subpoenas, administering of
oaths, requiring that charges be in writing, and providing an opportunity to be heard). In
the most formal of arbitration proceedings, in which the arbitrator has all or nearly all the
powers of a traditional trial court, the reasons for absolute privilege are exceptionally com-
pelling. When an arbitrator has the power to compel testimony, through the powers of sub-
poena and recommendation for citation for contempt, witnesses in a proceeding must be
given absolute privilege to prevent possible civil liability in defamation as a consequence of
obeying an arbitrator's directions.
79. 459 A.2d at 1060.
80. Id
81. Id. at 1059.
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phone calls or conferences between opposing parties and counsel for the
purpose of reaching some settlement prior to the arbitration hearing ap-
pear to be worthy of absolute privilege. The risk of damage to reputation
as a result of private communication between the parties is limited. Fur-
ther, whatever damage might be inflicted could be mitigated by the injured
party exercising his or her right to be heard in the subsequent arbitration
hearing.
It may be surmised that ancillary communications relating to a bona
fide issue of the dispute which further the judicial integrity of the proceed-
ing would seem to fit within the framework and rationale for granting ab-
solute privilege in Sturdivant. As in the case of traditional court
proceedings, the test would seem to be whether there is reasonable rele-
vance to the determination of the dispute.8 2 Communications that are rea-
sonably relevant to the proceedings would seem to parallel the traditional
court test and fall within the purview of absolute privilege.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Sturdivant court granted absolute privilege to a statement made by a
witness during a grievance arbitration hearing. The court's step was a nec-
essary one in ensuring that such proceedings are not hindered by hesitation
and concern over subsequent liability for defamation. In an arbitration
proceeding, as in the courtroom, it is best to fully ventilate all possibly
relevant information, allowing the impartial decision maker, with help
from the opposing party's refutations, to separate important information
from that which is superfluous.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals' extension of absolute privi-
lege to arbitration proceedings is a welcomed attempt by the court to make
arbitration more judicial in nature, and thus a closer substitute for the re-
lief people seek through the courts. The court is undoubtedly hoping that
arbitration, including the District of Columbia Superior Court's new vol-
untary arbitration program, will serve as a relief valve for the heavy case
load burdening the District of Columbia courts.
William J Andrle, Jr.
82. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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